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ABSTRACT: Assertives have a word-to-world ‘direction-of-fit’: their illocutionary point is that the word 
should fit the world. Directives and commissives have a world-to-word direction-of-fit: their illocutionary point 
is to make the world fit the word. Arguments in politics and practical argumentation generally are often about 
directives or commissives, and many of these cannot meaningfully be reconstructed as assertives. Nevertheless, 
many theorists of argumentation proceed, tacitly or explicitly, as if all arguments must be about assertives, 
thereby obfuscating matters.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
It is a straightforward observation that the subjects or issues about which people argue in 
real-life argument belong to different types of speech act. 
 Austin (1962, pp. 150-163) first distinguished between types of speech acts (or 
illucutionary acts). Searle (1975, 1979) developed the idea and five basic classes as 
follows:  
 
If we adopt illocutionary point as the basic notion on which to classify uses of language, then there 
are a rather limited number of basic things we do with language: we tell people how things are, we 
try to get them to do things, we commit ourselves to do things, we express our feelings and 
attitudes and we bring about changes through our utterances (1979, p. 29). 
 
 The terms proposed by Searle for these five basic classes of illocutionary acts are, 
in the same order: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declaratives.  
 Despite this insight modern argumentation theory tends to assume, either that all 
subjects of argumentation belong to one and the same type: assertives, or that they should 
be treated as if they did. I will try to show, first, that the subjects of many real-life 
arguments are directives or commissives; second, that to reconstruct such directives or 
commissives as assertives sometimes loses more insight than it gains. 
 The assumption, usually tacit, that all subjects of argument are assertives I will 
call the naïve assertive theory. There is also a sophisticated assertive theory. It recognizes 
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that often the subject of argumentation is not on the face of it an assertive, but it then goes 
on to reconstruct it as one.  
 A look at some authentic examples will suffice to refute the naïve assertive 
theory.  
 
2. ARGUING FOR DIRECTIVES AND COMMISSIVES 
 
In a famous broadcast on February 9, 1941, Winston Churchill made a plea to the United 
States to support Britain’s war effort. Addressing President Roosevelt directly, he 
concluded: 
 
Put your confidence in us. Give us your faith and your blessing, and, under Providence, all will be 
well. 
 We shall not fail or falter; we shall not weaken or tire. Neither the sudden shock of battle, 
nor the long-drawn trials of vigilance and exertion will wear us down. Give us the tools, and we 
will finish the job. 
 
 What Churchill tried to make Roosevelt and the United States accept, after a 
series of promises that served as reasons, was not an assertion or proposition, but a plea 
expressed in imperatives—in other words, a directive. 
 Soaring even higher in seriousness and oratory, these are the words of Christ in 
the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5, 43-48). Like Churchill, Christ argues for a 
directive speech act expressed by a number of imperatives:  
 
You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I say to 
you, love your enemies, and pray for those who persecute you, that you may be children of your 
heavenly Father, for he makes his sun rise on the bad and the good, and causes rain to fall on the 
just and the unjust. For if you love those who love you, what recompense will you have? Do not 
the tax collectors do the same? And if you greet your brothers only, what is unusual about that? Do 
not the pagans do the same? So be perfect, just as your heavenly Father is perfect. 
 
 On July 2, 1945, President Truman ended his Address Before the Senate on the 
proposal for the UN Charter with these words: 
 
This Charter points down the only road to enduring peace. There is no other. Let us not hesitate to 
join hands with the peace-loving peoples of the earth and start down that road, with God’s help, 
and with firm resolve that we can and will reach our goal.  
 I urge ratification. I urge prompt ratification.  
 Thank you. 
 
 Truman, too, argues by giving reasons in order to have his hearers accept a plea, 
that is, a directive speech act, but unlike Churchill and Christ he avoids imperatives. Still, 
the purpose of his speech act is not to get the Senate to accept some proposition about UN 
as true or acceptable; he urges them to perform the collective act of ratification.  
 The next example is similar. It is a famous piece of forensic oratory: the 
concluding sentences of Clarence Darrow’s summation to the jury in the trial against the 
Sweet family in Detroit, an African-American family accused of firing a gun against an 
aggressive white mob surrounding the house they had just bought in an all-white 
neighborhood: 
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I ask you, on behalf of this defendant, on behalf of these helpless ones who turn to you, and more 
than that–on behalf of this great state, and this great city which must face this problem, and face it 
fairly,–I ask you, in the name of progress and of the human race, to return a verdict of not guilty in 
this case! 
 
We now descend to an utterly mundane field of argument: advertising. An ad for Camel 
cigarettes from the time of the Second World War goes: 
 
If Camels are not your present brand, try them. Not just because they’re the favorite in the service 
or at home - but for the sake of your own smoking enjoyment, try Camels. 
 
Another cigarette advertisement making an argument, this time from the ‘fifties: 
 
Only a perfect balance of sunshine and moisture produces vintage tobacco—with its qualities of 
gentleness and delicate flavor. These qualities tell why PHILIP MORRIS has made so many 
friends among younger smokers—with their fresher, unspoiled tastes. Follow Young America’s 
lead. Enjoy PHILIP MORRIS in the convenient Snap-Open pack. 
 
These ads are clearly arguments. In both, reasons are given for a conclusion; in both the 
conclusion is a directive: try Camels, enjoy Philip Morris. 
 Argumentative discourse arguing for a directive, such as a plea, a proposal or a 
prayer, is also found in the language of lovemaking, or in simulated speech acts of 
lovemaking such as we find in poetry; a famous love poem by Christopher Marlowe 
begins: 
 
Come live with me and be my love, 
And we will all the pleasures prove 
That valleys, groves, hills, and fields, 
Woods or steepy mountain yields. 
 
What the speaker argues for in this poem by making a long series of promises might 
perhaps best be called a proposal—a combined directive and commissive: please do this, 
and we will do all these together.  
 Now for some commissives: 
 
A sustainable Australia presents the opportunity to save the Great Barrier Reef from climate 
change, to turn around and repair the degradation to our greatest inland river system the Murray-
Darling, and to foster a vibrant and competitive clean and efficient economy, and give us all 
meaning as we pursue a truly worthy endeavour.  
 We are the privileged generation to face this challenge and opportunity. We still have 
time and we can make the changes needed. Let’s just get on with the job of achieving a sustainable 
Australia!  
 
Thus concluded a speech by Don Henry, Director of the Australian Conservation 
Foundation, at a 2002 Round Table on the theme: “Should we Sign the Kyoto Protocol?” 
What makes it a commissive is that it calls for collective acceptance by the body to which 
the speaker himself belongs of an obligation to undertake some action. The forms Let’s or 
Let us are characteristic of these speech acts. 
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 Another form used for commissives is the subjunctive, marked in the singular by 
the absence of the suffix -s; an example is this resolution proposed to the US Senate by 
Senator Harris from Kansas, in the 1899 debate on whether to ratify the treaty that would 
have conferred statehood to the Philippines:  
 
That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise permanent 
sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over the Philippine Islands […] 
 
The Senator is not asserting or predicting anything; instead, his speech argues for a 
collective, declarative speech act to be performed by the US Senate. 
 The subjunctive form of a directive is also found in this typical car advertisement 
from 1958: 
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The copy says:  
 
Not long after the motorist takes possession of his new Cadillac, he discovers that the car 
introduces him in a unique manner. Its new beauty and elegance, for instance, speak eloquently of 
his taste and judgment. Its new Fleetwood luxury indicates his consideration for his passengers,. 
And its association with the world’s leading citizens acknowledges his standing in the world of 
affairs. Incidentally, this is a wonderful year to let a Cadillac tell its story on your behalf!. We 
suggest you see your dealer—and that you place your order for early delivery. 
 
 All the above examples argue for a directive or a commissive (or something in 
between). This refutes the naïve assertive theory. 
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 But does such a theory really exist? The answer is that while modern 
argumentation theories perhaps do not claim explicitly that the subject of every argument 
is an assertion, many of them tacitly proceed as if it were. An example of such a theory is 
Toulmin’s The Uses of Argument (1958); the claims he discusses are all simple factual 
assertions like Harry is a British subject or Anne has red hair.  
 However, Toulmin’s book was intended to make a statement in the philosophy of 
science, which may be why the only claims it analyzes are of this kind. Elsewhere he 
shows great awareness of the distinctive features of ethical or practical argument (e.g., 
Toulmin 1950, 1981, Jonsen & Toulmin 1988). 
 
3. A TYPOLOGY OF CLAIMS IN ARGUMENT 
 
This suggests that it might be helpful here with a simple and provisional typology of 
claims in argument. Purely factual claims would represent one extreme; in the table 
below they are category 1.  
 Distinct from this is the type of claim that Toulmin’s own 1958 theory may 
exemplify. We may call this the category of interpretive claims; their function is to 
propose a different, purportedly better interpretation or conceptual framework in which to 
see a well-known phenomenon (category 2). Much argument in the humanities, but also 
in ethics and politics, is of this kind. Unlike category 1 claims there is no clear-cut set of 
truth conditions by which category 2 claims may be conclusively tested as true or false; 
the reasons speaking for an interpretive claim will often be that it fits reality better, is 
more revealing, and all in all a good idea.  
 An argument like that already has something in common with the next categories: 
category 3 contains overtly normative claims, such as Bullfighting is evil or Matisse is 
better than Picasso. From there the distance is short to practical claims which propose 
actions or policies, such as We should choose to do X (category 4).  
 Many current textbooks of argument and critical thinking apply (some of) these 
distinctions, e.g., Rieke & Sillars (1984), who distinguish between factual claims, value 
claims, and policy claims. It is less often recognized that policy claims (category 4) are 
not claims in the sense of being propositions; “proposals” is the proper term. This is 
because their illocutionary point is not to assert a state of affairs; it is to bring about a 
state of affairs. Hence their natural linguistic form is a directive (e.g., an imperative) or a 
commissive. However, they may assume the linguistic form of assertions, typically 
containing must, such as We must reduce CO2 emissions; or they may appear as 
assertions that the proposed policy is definitely superior to any alternative.  
 In such cases the assertive form of the proposal is rather unproblematically 
convertible into its directive or commissive form, such as, e.g., Let us reduce CO2 
emissions (category 5)—and conversely.  
 This may explain why few have challenged the sophisticated assertive theory, 
according to which all subjects of argument must be reconstructed and treated as 
assertives. There is admittedly a practical synonymy between an assertive and a 
directive/commissive—if, and only if, the assertive states that the action referred to is 
necessary, or the only advisable one. An argument with such an assertive as its claim 
would for all practical purposes imply the corresponding directive/commissive. 
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 However, as we saw above, there are many arguments for a directive or 
commissive that is not synonymous with an assertive stating that an action is necessary or 
the only advisable one. This is category 6 in the table. 
 
Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Types of 
claim 
Assertives: 
factual claims 
Assertives: 
interpretive 
claims 
Assertives: 
normative 
(value) 
claims 
Assertives: 
practical 
(policy) 
claims 
Directives 
/commissives 
convertible into 
assertives 
Directives/ 
Commissives not 
convertible into 
assertives  
Examples Harry is a 
British citizen 
[Toulmin’s 
argument theory] 
Bullfighting 
is evil 
We must 
reduce CO2 
emissions 
Let us reduce CO2 
emissions 
Come live with 
me and be my 
love 
Try Camels 
We suggest you 
place your order 
for early delivery 
Comments Propositions 
with clear truth 
conditions 
No clear truth 
conditions; 
normative and 
practical 
considerations 
involved 
No clear 
truth 
conditions 
Proposals The Directive/ 
Commissive is 
practically 
synonymous with an 
implicit or explicit 
general claim that a 
certain policy is 
unconditionally 
necessary or, all 
things considered, 
objectively better 
than all the 
alternatives 
The Directive/ 
Commissive is 
not practically 
synonymous 
with any implicit 
or explicit 
general claim 
that, etc.  
 
 
3. AGAINST THE SOPHISTICATED ASSERTIVE THEORY 
  
The most elaborate representative of the sophisticated assertive theory is pragma-
dialectics, which insists that any standpoint, if it is not already an assertive, should be 
reconstructed as one. The principle is stated categorically in van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst (1984):  
 
the argumentatively relevant moves must be assertives with some identifiable propositional 
content connected in some accountable way to the speech acts actually performed in the dialogue 
(1984, p. 92).  
 
Expressed opinions and argumentations consisting superficially of illocutions of some other type 
must first be analysed in such a way that it is clearly exactly what assertives are involved (1984, p. 
98).  
 
 Similarly, van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs (1993) rule out 
directives as standpoints:  
 
Where directives occur within a critical discussion, their role must be either to challenge a 
standpoint, request argumentation in defense of a standpoint, or to request information so as to 
clarify some issue (1993, p. 29).  
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 Why does pragma-dialectics consider this prescription necessary? The answer has 
to do with commitment or “committedness”: pragma-dialectics regards it “as the 
illocutionary point of the members of the classes of assertives to commit the speaker (to a 
greater or lesser degree) to the acceptability of the expressed position” (1984, p. 97). 
And:  
 
If these expressed opinions and argumentations could not be construed as assertives a resolution of 
the dispute would be impossible, since it is only possible to resolve disputes thanks to the specific 
committedness associated with the performance of assertives (1984, 98). 
 
 This “committedness” is essentially the same feature that Searle describes as 
follows:  
  
The point or purpose of the assertive class is to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to 
something’s being the case, to the truth of the expressed position. All of the members of the 
assertive class are assessable on the dimension of assessment which includes true and false (1979, 
p. 12).  
 
The pragma-dialectical insistence on treating all standpoints as assertives in this sense 
reflects the interpretive axiom that  
 
argumentative discourse is conceived as aimed at resolving a difference of opinion by putting the 
acceptability of the ‘standpoints’ at issue to the test by applying criteria that are both problem-
valid as well as intersubjectively valid (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2003, p. 387; similar 
formulations in many other writings).  
 
So the need to convert other speech act types into assertives is dictated by the axiom that 
all argumentation should be held against the ideal of dispute resolution. There is a 
qualification: just as Searle speaks about commitment to truth “in varying degrees” and 
the dimension which “includes” true and false, so the pragma-dialecticians’ 
committedness is to the “acceptability” of an “identifiable propositional content,” not 
necessarily to its “truth”; they rightly point out that there are many “ethical, aesthetic, or 
other normative statements to which the true/false criterion does not apply” (1984, p. 96; 
these are our category 3). But such a statement is nevertheless an assertive, and in arguing 
for it an arguer is committed to some “identifiable propositional content.” This is 
necessary if there are to be intersubjectively valid criteria by which the acceptability of 
the conflicting standpoints can be put to the test. Pragma-dialectical principles demand 
two standpoints that are incompatible because one makes an assertion with identifiable 
propositional content that is denied or doubted by the other. Only then is it guaranteed 
that critical discussion can lead towards one of the standpoints being retracted and the 
dispute thus being resolved, because only assertives have the necessary committedness to 
an identifiable propositional content.  
 The problem with the assertive reconstruction is that it neutralizes a difference of 
kind. Reconstructing directives and commissives as assertives does not merely add a 
missing feature: it basically changes a speech act of one type into its contrary opposite. 
This sometimes has little practical relevance, namely when an argument for a directive or 
commissive presents an action as necessary or the only advisable one. But severe 
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problems with the assertive reconstruction arise when this is not the case, that is, when 
the directive or commissive presents the action referred to as a choice—a choice which it 
urges upon the hearer. 
 The difference of kind between assertives and other speech act types has to do 
with what Austin (1953), Anscombe (1957), Searle (1975, 1979, 1983), and others have 
called their “direction of fit.” Assertives have a word-to-world direction-of-fit. Directives 
and commissives have a world-to-word direction of fit. The difference, to use a 
formulation by Bernard Williams (1966), is between discourse which “has to fit the 
world” and discourse which “the world has to fit.” Humberstone (1992, p. 60) has 
proposed the terms “thetic” for the word-to-world direction of fit and “telic” for the 
world-to-word direction of fit; commissives and directives are telic, whereas assertives 
are thetic; that is why the illocutionary point of a directive or a commissive is not a 
commitment to any “identifiable propositional content.” The contrary opposition thetic-
telic is precisely what the assertive reconstruction is meant to suspend. 
 However, in the examples above the suspension of this difference is at least 
questionable and in some cases impossible; that is, we cannot formulate any one assertion 
which fittingly represents the arguer’s standpoint.  
 The Cadillac ad, for instance, argues for a directive to place an “order for early 
delivery” of the new Fleetwood. How can we reconstruct this directive as an assertive? It 
would be ludicrous to say that the ad asserts that for the reasons given, it is necessary to 
buy this car. Does it assert that it is reasonable or advisable to buy it? No, General 
Motors hardly intends to make the potential customer consider the purchase in terms of 
what’s “reasonable.” Pragma-dialectics would reconstruct the text as asserting that the 
purchase is “acceptable.” But what could that mean? That the offer of this car (at the 
current price, which is not mentioned) is acceptable? That only defers the problem. Does 
it mean that the purchase should be accepted? By this reading the ad asserts that it is 
somehow necessary for the reader of this ad to buy this car, a claim we found ludicrous 
just before. Or does the phrase mean that the purchase may be accepted by some readers? 
Probably the ad in 1958 did make some readers accept the purchase; but that is irrelevant, 
for the reconstruction with may is not an empirical assertion, but a judgement. Could it 
mean that some readers are justified in finding the purchase acceptable? Then why only 
some, but not all? On what grounds can we decide that the purchase would be acceptable 
for some, and who would they be? Or does it mean that the purchase is acceptable for its 
specific reader just now? That opens the assumption, unusual in argumentation theory, 
that acceptability varies from one individual to the next, in other words, that acceptability 
is subjective; yet the assertion “buying this car is acceptable for me” is still unacceptably 
vague. Does it mean “I must buy it”? We have already rejected that interpretation twice. 
Does it mean “I could buy it”? Well, maybe I could if I had the money, but on money the 
ad is naturally silent. So what else could be the meaning of the assertion that I could buy 
this car?  
 Of course there are no answers to all these questions. What the ad tries to do is not 
to make me accept an assertion, but to make me buy the car by making me want to buy it. 
The reconstruction of the directive as an assertive saying “the purchase of this car is 
acceptable” makes the speech act performed by the ad meaningless; this assertive has no 
“identifiable propositional content,” and there are no the “intersubjectively valid criteria” 
by which to put the dispute (if dispute it is) between the carmaker and the reader to the 
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test.1 Like many directives or commissives in advertising, everyday talk, workplace 
conversation, lovemaking, religious or instructional language, this ad is telic, not thetic; it 
urges the reader or hearer to make the world conform to the speaker’s word in a certain 
respect. The illocutionary act performed by such discourse is to try to make the hearer 
follow a call to a personal choice, not to commit its speaker to the assertion of an 
identifiable propositional content. Whether the reasons offered for the directive or 
commissive give it enough aggregate strength to make the individual hearer actually 
follow the call is that individual’s personal (that is, subjective) decision.   
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
An argument for a directive or commissive is, in many cases, simply a meeting and 
perhaps a clash of wills. The subject of the dispute, if indeed we can call it a dispute, is 
not an assertion to whose acceptability or non-acceptability the two parties, respectively, 
are committed. There are no intersubjectively valid criteria that will help solve the 
dispute; and there is no necessity for either party to retract. In arguments over such 
directives or commissives, there is no implication that a resolution of the dispute is 
possible; that is precisely why pragma-dialectics insists that directive or commissive 
standpoints expressed be reconstructed as assertives. But the criteria by which the hearer 
accepts or rejects the call to buy the Cadillac cannot be made “intersubjectively valid” by 
any reconstruction. If a reader of the Cadillac ad accepts its proposal, then that is 
tantamount to saying that he now wants to buy the car. It is definitely not tantamount to 
saying, e.g., that it is reasonable or acceptable for anyone to buy the car, let alone that he 
thinks everybody ought to buy it. (In fact, he might find that very undesirable because 
part of some people’s desire to own a Cadillac probably stems from the fact that few 
people do.) 
 What directives or commissives do is to exert a certain influence on the hearer, 
and if there is argument, this influence is backed up, and presumably fortified, by 
reasons. To substitute a directive or commissive with an assertive, for example one 
containing the predicate “acceptable,” is to replace a speech act whose validity or non-
validity resides in the subjective domain (because it is each individual’s decision) with a 
speech act whose validity or non-validity resides in an objective domain—but which is 
unfortunately meaningless. To reconstruct the call for this subjective choice with an 
intersubjective assertion falsifies it and/or makes it vacuous, as when the term 
“acceptable” is used.  
 To at least some extent, a similar point could be made about all the other 
examples. True enough, in much discourse arguing for a directive or commissive the 
latter may, for all practical purposes, be reconstructed as an assertive; but there is also a 
lot of discourse where this is not the case. To dictate that all arguments for non-assertive 
speech acts must be reconstructed by theory as arguments for assertives, even if that 
                                                 
1 I do not deny that the copy in the ad makes several assertions with identifiable propositional content. I 
deny that the directive standpoint which the assertions made in the ad are meant to argue for has 
identifiable propositional content. Also, I propose that my above analysis, which aims to show the vacuity 
of assertive reconstructions of this standpoint, applies equally to reconstructions along the lines of “My 
standpoint is that the assertion ‘You will place your order for early delivery’ is acceptable”—the kind of 
reconstruction suggsted by Houtlosser (1994).  
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theory is just an ideal model and not an empirical claim, runs the risk of blinding us to an 
essential fact about argument: namely that much argument represents attempts by some 
people to exert influence on the will of other people and hence on their free choice. Such 
influence is an essential function of human language and should not be ruled out by 
definition as illegitimate or less than ideal; where the borderline might be between 
legitimate and illegitimate influence is another story. 
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